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Abstract 
It is generally well known that emotion can benefit memory; however, much less is 
known about how emotion influences metamemory. The current thesis examined how list 
composition and emotion influences individuals’ metamnemonic judgments and 
performance in a free recall task. Participants studied lists of words that varied in 
emotional valence and made immediate judgments of learning (JOLs) after each word. 
Valence was manipulated in a mixed-list design in Experiment 1, and a pure-list design in 
Experiment 2, while arousal was held constant. It was expected that valence would affect 
participants’ JOLs and recall performance, but only in Experiment 1. Consistent with this, 
emotional words were given higher JOLs and were recalled better than neutral words in 
Experiment 1, while no such differences were observed in Experiment 2. Results suggest 
that the metamnemonic effect of emotion is limited to mixed-list designs, and likely 
depends on participants’ beliefs about how emotion influences memory. 
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I Believe in a Thing Called Emotion:  
The Influence of Valence on Memory Monitoring and Performance 
The influence of emotion on memory has long been a topic of interest to 
psychologists and laypersons alike. Notably, in an early essay titled “What is an 
Emotion?” William James (1884, p. 300) asked, “how much of our mental life is knit up 
with our corporeal frame?”. Questions such as these suggest that emotion plays an 
interactive role with respect to both our physiological and cognitive processes. Indeed, 
early investigations of emotion’s influence on cognitive mechanisms focused on whether 
events that are encoded in a certain state are easier to retrieve in the same state or in a 
different state (e.g., Network Theory of Emotions, Bower, 1981; Affect Infusion Model, 
Forgas, 1995; Mood-Dependent Memory, McGeoch, 1942). We know that memory is 
better for items tested in the same context as they are encoded (Context-Dependent 
Learning, Eich, 1980; Encoding Specificity Principle, Tulving & Thomson, 1973), thus 
the notion that theories of emotion have followed this premise is not surprising.  
Investigations of the influence of emotion on memory also involve memory for 
emotional information while in a neutral state. Such research has primarily manipulated 
the emotional content of stimuli such as words (e.g., Hourihan, Fraundorf, & Benjamin, 
2017; Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Talmi & Moscovitch, 2004) and pictures (e.g., Bradley, 
Greenwald, Petry, & Lang, 1992; Hourihan & Bursey, 2016; Talmi & McGarry, 2012), 
and generally converge on the finding that emotional stimuli are better remembered than 
non-emotional stimuli (for a review, see Kensinger, 2009). However, inconsistencies have 
arisen with respect to which dimension of emotion (i.e., arousal or valence) primarily 
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influences memory. As such, one purpose of the current set of experiments was to further 
investigate this ambiguity.  
Recently, researchers have been interested in the influence of emotion on 
metacognition (i.e., monitoring and control of cognition; e.g., Efklides & Petkaki, 2005; 
Hourihan et al., 2017; Koriat & Nussinson, 2009; Nomi, Rhodes, & Cleary, 2013; Tauber 
& Dunlosky, 2012; Zimmerman & Kelley, 2010). As aforementioned, the effect of 
arousal and valence on memory is, in reality, quite inconsistent; however, conclusions 
drawn from the effect of emotion on metamemory are generally unvarying. Specifically, 
participants give higher predictions of future recall for emotional stimuli relative to 
neutral stimuli, even when their memory performance is unaffected by emotionality 
(Hourihan et al., 2017; Nomi et al., 2013). Critically, however, the mechanisms 
underlying this effect remain unclear. It has been speculated (e.g., Hourihan et al., 2017), 
but remains debatable as to whether the effects of emotion on metamemory are primarily 
influenced directly via intrinsic qualities of emotional stimuli (e.g., imageability), or if 
metacognitive knowledge (e.g., beliefs about how memory works) acts as a mediating 
factor. Thus, the primary objective of this thesis was to further investigate the proposed 
mechanisms responsible for the metamnemonic effect of emotional stimuli.  
In the rest of the introduction I will discuss the aspects that define emotional 
stimuli and their role in metamemory processes. Then I will discuss the role of list 
structure in making judgments of learning. Finally, I describe two experiments that bring 
these literatures together, and propose that the effects of emotion on metamemory are 
primarily driven by list structure, coupled with participants’ beliefs regarding the 
differential memorability of emotional and non-emotional information.  
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1.1 Scope of emotionality: Arousal and valence 
The examination of emotion begins with defining two aspects of emotional 
stimuli: arousal and valence. Word stimuli with these qualities are commonly quantified 
by numbers from 1 (low) to 8 (high), based on a large sample norming study (Affective 
Norms for English Words [ANEW], Bradley & Lang, 2010). The dimension of arousal 
indicates the level of ‘energy’ associated with an emotional word, from low to high; 
valence represents the ‘pleasantness’ or ‘attractiveness’ of a word, from negative to 
positive. For example, “excitement” is a high arousal, positive word; “bored” is a low 
arousal, negative word. It has been suggested that emotional information is more 
accurately retained (compared to non-emotional information) primarily due to the 
dimension of arousal (Kensinger, 2004; MacLeod & Matthews, 2004). More specifically, 
research has shown that arousing information is more likely to be attended to, facilitating 
encoding of said information (Kensinger, 2009; MacLeod & Matthews, 2004). Once 
encoded, arousing information may also be more likely to be retrieved, though evidence 
fails to explain specifically how emotion influences retrieval (Hamann, 2001). It also has 
been postulated that arousing information is remembered more accurately than neutral 
information because it engages different metacognitive processes than the mechanisms 
responsible for the memorability of non-emotional information (e.g., additional rehearsal, 
Reisberg & Heuer, 2004). Specifically, participants may have more intent to focus their 
attention during encoding when information is more arousing (Efklides, 2016). 
Although this argument exists, research also indicates that arousing information 
does not provide any benefit to the degree of detail encoded (Mather, 2007). Instead, 
effects of arousal on memory may be best characterized by focal enhancements (Mather, 
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2007; Reisberg & Heuer, 2004). For example, participants with high anxiety have been 
shown to focus more on negative information compared to individuals expressing low 
levels of anxiety, resulting in better memory for this information (e.g., Ferguson, 
Moghaddam, & Bibby, 2007; MacLeod & Mathews, 2004). Although these postulated 
theories are moderately independent from one another, they all converge on the notion 
that some aspects of an emotional experience are better remembered primarily due to the 
dimension of arousal. 
A closer examination of the effect of valence on recall suggests that it is able to 
influence memory independently from arousal (e.g., Hourihan et al., 2017; Kensinger & 
Corkin, 2003). However, discrepant results explaining this dimension of emotion also 
exist. Similar to the proposed effects of arousal, negative valence has been related to focal 
memory enhancements, whereas positive valence has been negatively related to overall 
memory performance (Kensinger, O’Brien, Swanberg, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2007). 
Additionally, neuroimaging studies have found that positively and negatively valenced 
information activates different regions of the brain (e.g., the amygdala, cingulate gyrus, 
and bilateral frontal and parietal areas). More specifically, memory for negatively 
valenced information has been associated with sensory processing areas (compared to 
positive and neutral valence), whereas memory for positive information has been linked 
with areas that are active during self-referential processing (Mickley & Kensinger, 2008). 
Results such as these therefore suggest that the emotional influence on memory may be a 
product of the varying cognitive processes utilized during initial encoding.  
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1.2 Emotional influences on metamemory 
Metamemory can be simply understood as an individual’s introspective 
knowledge about one’s own memory capabilities. Metamemory research focuses on a 
core set of issues that pertain to people’s beliefs about memory, their monitoring of 
memory, and their control of memory. Flavell (1979) introduced a model of 
metacognitive monitoring which details four main aspects: metacognitive knowledge, 
metacognitive experiences, goals, and strategies. Metacognitive knowledge relates to 
beliefs that individuals may have about their cognitive abilities, and may include beliefs 
about a task or beliefs regarding the best learning strategies. For example, one may 
possess a belief that they will perform badly on tests because they believe they are a bad 
test taker. Metacognitive experiences include contextual cues that arise during a task. 
Goals and strategies represent metacognitive control processes that interact with the 
cognitive processes recruited during monitoring. One of the most common measures of 
memory monitoring is to directly ask participants to rate the likelihood of remembering a 
stimulus at some point in the future. Such judgments of learning (JOLs) are commonly 
assessed via responses on an ordinal or ratio scale (Arbuckle & Cuddy, 1969).  
As the methods used to evaluate the mechanisms of metamemory mirror those of 
memory, many of the theories used to explain memory performance are applicable to that 
of metamemory. One of the most commonly accepted theories of how individuals make 
JOLs is cue utilization theory (Koriat, 1997). Cue utilization theory states that making a 
JOL is an inferential process, based on three kinds of cues: intrinsic cues, extrinsic cues, 
and mnemonic cues. Intrinsic cues are those that are inherent to study items, such as 
concreteness. Extrinsic cues are those that are associated with the study context itself, 
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such the location of stimuli on a computer screen. Lastly, mnemonic cues are the internal, 
subjective feelings evoked by items at the time of study, and may rely on a feeling 
fluency in individuals (i.e., retrieval fluency may be diagnostic of how well items are 
learned).  
Provided the extensive amount of research on the influence of emotional 
information on memory, it is surprising to see that relatively few studies have attempted 
to explore the relationship between emotional stimuli and memory monitoring. For 
example, research has shown that arousal and valence effects are consistent with Koriat’s 
(1997) cue utilization framework such that negative arousal enhances memory for 
intrinsic features but not extrinsic features (Kensinger et al., 2007). Emotion can be 
thought of as both an intrinsic and an extrinsic cue: It is an intrinsic feature of word 
stimuli, but an extrinsic cue in its relationship with mood. Mood-dependent memory 
effects often mirror those of context-dependent effects, wherein memory performance is 
optimal if the emotional context (or mood) at test matches the emotional context at 
encoding; as context is an extrinsic cue, memory for emotional stimuli might also be 
influenced by “emotion” as a contextual cue. Further, if JOLs are most sensitive to 
intrinsic cues, they may be influenced by participants’ theories regarding study items 
(e.g., theories regarding the degree of difficulty between items). The influence of 
mnemonic cues also suggests that JOLs may also be influenced by individual 
experiences. Given the versatility of emotion as either an intrinsic or extrinsic cue, it is 
then reasonable to suggest that participants’ JOLs may be influenced by both their 
theories regarding the effects of emotion on memory, and their emotional state during 
study. In general however, the literature appears to converge on the idea that JOLs are 
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most sensitive to intrinsic cues (e.g., Benjamin, 2003), but not extrinsic cues (e.g., Koriat 
& Bjork, 1994); therefore, any context-like effect of emotion does not likely influence 
participants’ JOLs.  
Recent research by Zimmerman and Kelley (2010) suggests that the experience of 
reading an emotional word does in fact influence participants’ JOLs. The researchers 
were interested in examining the effect of emotion on memory and memory monitoring, 
with the premise that emotional words are more easily recalled than non-emotional 
words. Participants were asked to study a list of neutral, negative, and positive valence 
word pairs for either a free recall or a cued recall test. As a measure of memory 
monitoring, participants were asked to provide immediate JOLs after studying each word 
pair. Zimmerman and Kelley found that participants predicted better recall for emotional 
word pairs compared to neutral word pairs, and this effect was consistent across test 
context. Interestingly, memory performance was only influenced by emotion for 
participants who completed the free recall test. From these results, they concluded that the 
emotionality of words does influence memory processes; however, the type of contextual 
test primarily influences performance.   
To further extend the results of Zimmerman and Kelley (2010), Tauber and 
Dunlosky (2012) conducted a study that included both younger and older adults. 
Following a similar procedure, they replicated the mnemonic benefit of emotional relative 
to neutral words in free recall; however, they found that only younger adults gave higher 
JOLs for positive information. This is surprising, as socioemotional selectivity theory 
would predict the opposite trend. Socioemotional selectivity is a theory of motivation that 
posits that individuals become more emotionally selective with age; more specifically, 
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selective to positive information compared to neutral information (see Carstensen, 1992). 
This theory would instead predict that older adults, rather than young adults, should spend 
less time allocating attention to negative stimuli and show increased recall for positive 
information. From this, Tauber and Dunlosky proposed that the dimension of arousal 
might have been responsible for the results, such that the physiological response evoked 
from reading an emotional word could have potentially influenced participants’ responses 
(e.g., interpreting a word as threatening, and subsequently utilizing the physiological 
response based on that interpretation as a basis for a higher JOL). Consistent with cue 
utilization theory (Koriat, 1997), they also suggested that participants may possess certain 
beliefs about the memorability of emotional stimuli (e.g., a belief that emotional and non-
emotional words are remembered differently), and these beliefs may have been driving 
the results.  
Critically, however, many of the conclusions drawn from the aforementioned 
studies were based on emotional stimuli that not only differed in valence, but also were 
higher in arousal compared to the neutral items. Based on the confounding of these two 
dimensions, it remains relatively unclear as to which factor is responsible for establishing 
the effects of emotion on metamemory. 
1.3 Possible explanations: The physiological and cognitive accounts 
In order to further delineate the mechanisms responsible for emotion’s influence 
on participants’ metacognitive judgments, Hourihan et al. (Experiment 1, 2017) asked 
participants to study a mixed list of high and low arousal words (equated for valence) for 
a later recall test. They hypothesized that if the influence of emotion on memory was 
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driven by arousal, high arousal words should be remembered better than low arousal 
words. Additionally, they reasoned that if the effect of emotion on metamemory is driven 
by the physiological response produced from reading an arousing word, participants 
should judge high arousal words to be remembered better than low arousal words, 
regardless of valence. Surprisingly, the researchers found that arousal did not have an 
influence on participants’ memory performance, but participants predicted that high 
arousal words would be better recalled than low arousal words. These results provided 
evidence that arousal can influence participants’ metamnemonic judgements. Hourihan et 
al. (2017) labeled this trend the physiological account, such that the experience of reading 
arousing words would be conductive of a physiological response, and participants could 
use this response as a cue for future item memorability. Specifically, the influence of 
arousal is proposed to lead to a feeling of processing fluency in the individual, which in 
turn would lead to greater predictions of recall, relative to non-arousing stimuli. Support 
for this account is evident from examinations of neural processes. For example, it has 
been proposed that the release of stress hormones enhances memory (Kensinger & 
Corkin, 2003), and also that encoding of arousing information leads to higher activity in 
the amygdala than that of neutral information (Mickley-Steinmetz & Kensinger, 2004).  
Nonetheless, these findings do not fully eliminate the potential influence of factors 
other than physiological arousal. Because emotionality is an intrinsic component of word 
stimuli (Koriat, 1997), it is logical to expect that participants may simply interpret high 
arousal words as being more “emotional” than low arousal words, even without variations 
in valence. Indeed, Hourihan et al. (2017) reasoned that participants might utilize a belief 
system about the memorability of emotional words when making predictive judgements. 
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They postulated that if participants use the intrinsic cue of emotion to make JOLs, then 
their judgements would be dependent on their interpretation of the memorability of each 
cue. Their Experiment 2 was conducted to further examine this possibility. Participants 
studied word lists composed of negative and neutral valence words, equated for arousal. It 
was predicted that emotional words would be recalled more accurately than neutral 
words, and participants would report JOLs that corresponded to this difference in 
emotion. The results yielded an effect of emotion, such that negative valence words were 
better recalled than neutral valence words. JOLs were also sensitive to this; participants 
correctly predicted negative valence words to be better recalled than neutral words. 
Critically, this effect emerged even though the word stimuli were equated on the 
dimension of arousal, providing evidence against the physiological account. The 
researchers concluded that participants based their responses on a belief that emotional 
information should benefit recall, and termed this the cognitive account. Ultimately, these 
results suggest that the effects of emotion on memory and metamemory may instead be 
determined via a conscious interpretation of the stimuli, rather than physiological 
responses.  
1.4 The influence of list structure 
 Notably, prior investigations of the benefit to memory for emotional information 
have been mixed-list designs where different ‘types’ of stimuli are compared in a single 
context (e.g., Dewhurst & Parry, 2000). We know from other cognitive phenomena (e.g., 
the Generation Effect, Slamecka & Graf, 1979; the Production Effect, MacLeod, Gopie, 
Hourihan, Neary, & Ozubko, 2010) that certain memory effects appear to be limited to 
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these designs, as opposed to pure designs. For example, both the Generation and the 
Production effects state that generated and produced words are remembered better than 
non-generated and non-produced words, respectively. Critically, these effects are evident 
when both generated (or produced) items and non-generated (or non-produced) items are 
studied together (as in mixed-list designs), but fail to be observed in pure-list designs (but 
see Fawcett, 2013). Additionally, the Perceptual Fluency Hypothesis states that items that 
are easier to perceive at study are more memorable than items that are perceived as less 
fluent (e.g., Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998). This is also applicable in studies of 
metamemory: Susser, Mulligan, and Besken (2013) found that participants give higher 
JOLs to items that they perceive as more fluent. Taken together, these results indicate that 
JOLs may reflect a comparative process based on participants’ perceived fluency between 
“types” of stimuli encountered.  
Following this logic, Hourihan et al. reasoned that their results (Experiment 2, 
2017) might have been due to participants’ comparing emotional and neutral valence 
words in a mixed-list design. Specifically, they suggested that negative words might have 
been seen as distinctive compared to neutral words. In order to more precisely investigate 
the combinatory effects of list structure and emotion on participants’ metacognitive 
judgements, Hourihan et al. conducted a third experiment using a continuous-levels 
design. Here, participants studied words that were selected from the entire range of 
valence and arousal values, from low to high. The premise was that if participants rely on 
the relative fluency between items, then emotional words must appear relatively 
distinctive compared to a “background” of neutral words (Schmidt, 1991; Talmi, 2013). 
Indeed, multi-level modelling yielded no effect of valence or arousal on participants’ 
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JOLs or their memory performance. By using a design that no longer allowed emotional 
items to be distinctive from neutral items, the effect of emotion on metamemory (and 
memory) was eradicated. Hourihan et al. concluded that it appeared as though participants 
assigned higher JOLs to emotional words based on an explicit belief that these stimuli 
simply should be more memorable. This additionally lends support to their cognitive 
account, such that the metamnemonic benefit of emotion is proposed to rely upon both a 
mixed list composition, and participants’ cognitive appraisal of the study items. 
1.5 Current thesis 
Recent evidence appears to converge on the notion that the effects of emotion on 
metamemory are dependent on the experimental design (e.g., Hourihan et al., 2017; 
Tauber & Dunlosky, 2012). As aforementioned, Hourihan et al. (2017) found a 
metamnemonic effect of emotion using negative and neutral valence words in a mixed-list 
context (Experiment 2), but not with a pure list of words that varied in both arousal and 
valence (Experiment 3), suggesting that the metamnemonic effect of emotion may indeed 
be limited (or at least moderated) by the experimental design. If JOLs for emotional 
words rely upon the relative distinctiveness created from a mixed list of emotional and 
neutral words, then a further examination of how JOLs vary for mixed and pure lists is 
required to fully support their proposed cognitive account. For example, it is still 
unknown as to whether the effect is replicable with respect to positive and neutral lists, 
while keeping arousal constant. 
If the effect of emotion on JOLs is moderated by the experimental design, then 
participants in mixed-list designs are expected to give higher JOLs to emotional items 
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compared to neutral items, due to the relative distinctiveness of emotional words. 
Additionally, however, Hourihan et al. (2017) suggested that the metamnemonic effect of 
emotion might be coupled with participants’ explicit belief that emotional information is 
remembered differently than neutral information. In order to fully assess this proposition, 
it is essential to explicitly query participants in a post-test questionnaire. It is possible that 
participants could actually give higher JOLs to emotional (both negative and positive) 
words, even when studied in a pure list, if they are able to enact their beliefs about the 
effects of emotion on memory. 
The current study compared recall performance and JOLs of emotional and 
neutral words. Given that valence has been shown to affect performance independently 
from arousal (e.g., Hourihan et al., 2017; Kensinger, 2009) the dimension of valence was 
manipulated with arousal equated (at the midpoint). In Experiment 1, each participant 
studied two mixed lists of words—negative and neutral valence, and positive and neutral 
valence—and made immediate JOLs after each word. Experiment 2 was procedurally 
identical to the first, with the exception that each participant studied two lists composed 
of only one “type” of emotional word— negative, positive, or neutral. At the end of each 
experiment, participants were asked to complete a paper-and-pencil questionnaire 
regarding their thoughts and beliefs about emotion and memory, and what they noticed 
about the words in the experiment (see Appendix B).  
Consistent with evidence for the benefit of emotional information to memory 
(e.g., Hourihan et al., 2017; Kensinger, 2009; Tauber & Dunlosky, 2010), it is expected 
that participants will recall more emotional words than neutral words. Due to inconsistent 
conclusions regarding the mnemonic effect of valence (e.g., Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; 
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Kensinger et al., 2007), it is expected that the “emotionality” of words in general will 
serve as a cue to participants; therefore, performance in both experiments is not expected 
to differ based on whether participants studied positive or negative valence words. In 
terms of participants’ metamnemonic judgements, it is expected that the effect of emotion 
on participants’ JOLs will depend on list composition, coupled with their explicit noticing 
of emotional words. That is, when there are mixed-valence lists (as in Experiment 1), 
JOLs should be higher for emotional words compared to neutral words; conversely, when 
participants study pure lists (as in Experiment 2), there should be no observable 
differences in participants’ JOLs. The post-test questionnaire is included to explicitly 
assess participants’ beliefs and their interpretation of the experimental design. These 
results are expected to support the cognitive account of the emotional JOL effect; 
participants should report that they noticed emotional and neutral words in the mixed lists 
(Experiment 1) and emotional pure lists (Experiment 2), but those who study the neutral 
pure list (Experiment 2) should not. Importantly, when participants are asked about the 
general effect of emotion on memory, it is expected that all will report that emotional 
information is more memorable than non-emotional information.  
It may be noted that performance may be related to individual differences in 
personality or anxiety level. It is important to consider individual differences in affect 
when examining the influence of emotion on memory and memory monitoring, as the 
degree to which memory is incremented (or impaired) may vary between participants. 
Importantly, a central tenant of theories regarding the influence of emotion on memory is 
that mood is a significant moderator; the relationship between positive information and 
memory is one that relies upon mood as a mediator of attention and performance. More 
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specifically, positive stimuli have been proposed to invoke a positive mood, which leads 
individuals to attend to events more broadly and process information heuristically (e.g., 
Bless, Clore, Schwarz, Golisano, Rabe, & Wolk, 1996; Kensinger et al., 2007; Storbeck 
& Clore, 2005). As an attempt to measure mood congruency, the post-test questionnaire 
includes the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS, Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988). The PANAS is a clinical measure that requires participants to read a list of 20 
words that describe different positive and negative emotions, and indicate how they are 
feeling at a given time on a scale from 1 (“very slightly or not at all”) to 5 (“extremely”). 
This measure will be used to show whether participants’ moods are predictive of their 
responses. For example, emotional words (either negative or positive) may be more 
salient to participants who are in a congruent mood, leading these words to be perceived 
as more memorable (relative to words incongruent with their mood). If scores on the 
positive and negative subscales of the PANAS were reliability correlated with 
metamemory or memory performance, this would suggest that participants’ performance 
might be primarily influenced by their mood, rather than the experimental design (e.g., 
Egidi & Gerrig, 2009; Fieldler & Hutter, 2013).  
2.1 Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was conducted to investigate whether the metamnemonic benefit of 
emotional words is driven by their relative distinctiveness compared to neutral words. A 
mixed-list design was used; emotional words were selected to vary in valence while 
arousal was held constant (at the midpoint). Participants studied two mixed lists and were 
asked to provide immediate JOLs after each word. Following each list, they were asked to 
complete a free recall test. If the effects of emotion on participants’ judgements are 
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indeed driven by the distinctiveness of emotional words compared to a background of 
neutral words, as predicted by Hourihan et al.’s (2017) cognitive account, participants are 
expected to assign higher JOLs to emotional words compared to neutral words. As 
described above, no differences between negative and positive valence words are 
expected. Similarly, it is expected that recall performance will follow this trend. 
Importantly, the post-test questionnaire is expected to capture participants’ pre-existing 
beliefs regarding the differential memorability of emotional and neutral information. 
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Participants. Sixty-eight undergraduate students at Memorial University of 
Newfoundland participated for one course credit. Two participants were not included in 
all data analyses due to failure to follow initial instructions, leaving a total of 66 
participants.  
2.2.2 Materials. The experiment ran on a computer (Windows 7 OS), using E-
Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). Two mixed lists of 20 words 
were selected from the ANEW database (Bradley & Lang, 2010; see Appendix A for 
word lists). Words were manually selected to be from the mid-range of arousal values 
(approximately 5.38). One list was composed of ten neutral and ten negative valence 
words, the other list was composed of ten neutral and ten positive valence words. The 
upper half of Table 2.1 displays the descriptive data for valence and arousal ratings, and 
frequency values for each word in Experiment 1. The lists differed significantly on 
valence [neutral vs. negative words: t(18) = 10.88, p < .001, neutral vs. positive words: 
t(18) = 17.36, p < .001, negative vs. positive words: t(18) = 28.65, p < .001] but not on 
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arousal [neutral vs. negative words: t(18) = 1.07, p = .299, neutral vs. positive words: 
t(18) = 0.19, p = .854, negative vs. positive words: t(18) = 0.922, p = .369]. SUBTLEXus 
log word frequencies were used as a measure of word frequency (Brysbaert & New, 
2009). The words did not differ significantly on log word frequency, neutral vs. negative 
words: t(18) = 0.52, p = .610, neutral vs. positive words: t(18) = 0.98, p = .342, negative 
vs. positive words: t(18) = 0.28, p = .780.  
The post-test questionnaire was included to query participants about their explicit 
beliefs regarding the memorability of emotional words (see Appendix B). The first 
several questions asked them about their thoughts about the experiment in general. For 
example, the first question stated, “In the experiment, do you think you recalled some 
words more easily than others?”; the second question stated, “Do you think your 
predictions of future recall (JOLs) were accurate?”. Other questions explicitly asked for 
their thoughts and beliefs regarding emotion and memory in general. For example, “Do 
you believe emotional words are remembered differently than neutral words?”. As a 
measure of mood congruency, the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; 
Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988) was included as the final question on the questionnaire. 
This measure was chosen based on its high internal consistency and representativeness of 
both positive and negative affect. 
2.2.3 Design. Emotion (Emotional vs. Neutral) and List Context (Negative vs. 
Positive) were manipulated within-subjects. Mean JOLs and mean proportion recall were 
the dependent measures obtained. The correspondence between JOLs and recall for each 
participant was computed with gamma, and the mean value for each word list was 
obtained. In order to assess the relative strength of support for each hypothesis, the results 
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of the JOL and recall analyses were subjected to Bayesian analysis. The posterior 
probabilities were computed in Microsoft Excel by inputting the appropriate information 
from the SPSS ANOVA output (see Masson, 2010). Questionnaire responses were coded 
based on the scheme in Appendix C. Participants’ scores on both the negative and 
positive subscales of the PANAS were computed as the sum of values assigned to each 
item. Further, a negative and positive emotional benefit score for each participant was 
computed by subtracting the mean proportion of neutral items from the mean of 
emotional items in the respective list (for both JOLs and recall performance). 
Correlational analyses were then conducted between participants’ PANAS scores and 
their computed benefit scores. 
 2.2.4 Procedure. Participants were tested in a room where up to three participants 
could be tested simultaneously. Each participant completed two blocks consisting of a 
study phase, a distractor phase, and a recall test phase. Participants were instructed that 
they would be shown two different word lists to study; each word would be presented one 
at a time, and their goal would be to remember as many words as possible for a 
subsequent memory test. Each word list was composed of an equal number of neutral and 
emotional words, such that participants studied one list of positive and neutral valence 
words, and another list of negative and neutral valence words.
1
 Each list was composed of 
20 words, such that all participants saw a total of 40 words. Word list order was 
counterbalanced across participants (i.e., positive and neutral word list first, or negative 
                                                 
 
1
 Neutral valence words were not repeated across lists 
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and neutral word list first) and word presentation order was randomized without 
restrictions (e.g., random presentation of emotional and neutral words in each list).   
Each study trial began with a 500ms blank screen. Words were individually 
presented in 18 pt. Bell MT font (black on a white background) for 2000ms and were 
followed by another blank screen for 500ms. After each word, participants were asked to 
make a prediction of how likely they thought it was that they would remember the word 
during a later recall test (i.e., make a JOL). Responses were selected from a scale 
presented at the bottom of the screen, which ranged from 1 (“definitely WILL NOT 
remember”) to 7 (“definitely WILL remember”). JOLs were self-paced.  
Following the study phase, participants were asked to complete a distractor task 
for three minutes. This task required participants to determine which of two alternatives 
was the same as the target geometric image, but rotated, by pressing the appropriate key 
on the keyboard. They were then given instructions for the test phase. Participants were 
asked to recall as many of the words from the most recent study phase that they could 
remember, in any order. They were instructed to type the words one at a time and press 
‘ENTER’ to submit each word. Recall was self-paced, and participants were instructed to 
guess when uncertain. An additional distractor task of simple arithmetic was presented 
after the first recall test for one minute. The second block followed the same procedure as 
the first, but a different word list was presented.  
Once participants had completed both blocks, they were instructed to see the 
researcher for the next part of the experiment. Participants were then asked to complete 
an eight item paper-and-pencil questionnaire (see Appendix B), and were given as much 
time as required for completion. The entire procedure lasted approximately 45 minutes.
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Table 2.1 Characteristics of the Word Lists in Experiments 1 and 2 
 Valence (1-9) Arousal (1-9) Log Word Frequency 
(number per million) 
Range Mean Range Mean Range Mean 
Experiment 1       
       Neutral (negative list) [3.97, 5.30] 4.69 (.43) [2.92, 6.38] 4.51 (.97) [1.48, 3.73] 2.76 (.84) 
       Neutral (positive list) [4.39, 5.43] 4.91 (.35) [3.50, 5.43] 4.55 (.68) [1.42, 3.05] 2.21 (.60) 
       Negative  [1.61, 3.00] 2.61 (.42) [4.13, 5.42] 4.87 (.45) [1.42, 3.56] 2.58 (.71) 
       Positive  [7.14, 8.26] 7.75 (.38) [2.87, 5.64] 4.61 (.78) [1.36, 3.39] 2.49 (.68) 
Experiment 2       
       Neutral  [4.00, 6.31] 5.14 (.55) [2.95, 6.93] 4.84 (.97) [1.23, 3.76] 2.62 (.56) 
       Negative  [1.25, 3.76] 2.66 (.61) [3.34, 6.84] 4.99 (.76) [1.51, 4.43] 2.59 (.61) 
       Positive  [6.73, 8.43] 7.55 (.42) [2.97, 6.77] 4.84 (.84) [1.54, 3.83] 2.75 (.59) 
Note: Standard deviations are displayed in parentheses beside their respective means. 
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2.3 Results  
Statistical significance was measured at p < .05 in all of the analyses to be 
discussed. Data from two participants were eliminated from all analyses due to failure to 
follow instructions (e.g., not completing the recall task), leaving 66 participants. Data 
from ten of these participants were not included in the gamma analysis due to missing 
data (e.g., if all JOLs are equal in a given condition, gamma cannot be computed); 
therefore, 56 participants were included in this analysis. Data from one participant was 
not included in correlational analyses due to failure to follow instructions (e.g., not 
assigning values to all items on the PANAS), leaving 65 participants for these analyses. 
 2.3.1 JOLs. A 2 (Emotion: Emotional vs. Neutral) x 2 (Context: Negative List vs. 
Positive List) x 2 (List Order: Negative First vs. Positive First) mixed factors analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with emotion and list context as within-subjects factors and list order 
as a between-subjects factor was conducted. As there was no significant effect of list 
order, or any interactions with emotion or context, list order was collapsed, all F’s < 
1.119, all p’s > .294.  
A 2 (Emotion: Emotional vs. Neutral) x 2 (Context: Negative List vs. Positive 
List) repeated measures ANOVA with both emotion and context as within-subjects 
factors was conducted. As hypothesized, there was a significant main effect of emotion, 
F(1, 65) = 107.83, MSE = 0.27, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .624, such that participants gave higher 
JOLs to emotional words (both negative and positive) relative to neutral words. There 
was no effect of context, F(1, 65) = 0.68, MSE = 0.32, p = .412, suggesting that JOLs did 
not differ across lists. The emotion x context interaction was also non-significant,  
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Figure 2.1 Mean JOL ratings across lists in experiment 1. Error bars represent standard 
error of the mean. 
 
F (1, 65) = 1.07, MSE= 0.20, p = .305, suggesting that JOLs given to emotional words 
and neutral words did not differ depending on which list the words were shown in. See 
Figure 2.1 for mean JOLs across lists. Bayesian analyses found that the posterior 
probability in favor of the main effect of emotion was pBIC(H1 | D) = 1.00, providing very 
strong evidence that emotion influenced participants’ JOLs, compared to neutral items. In 
terms of list context and the emotion x context interaction, there was positive evidence 
supporting the null, pBIC (H0 | D) = .852, pBIC(H0 | D) = .826, respectively.  
 2.3.2 Recall Performance. Recalled words were scored on strict criteria. Words 
that were spelled incorrectly but were clearly the correct item (e.g., “misqutio” instead of 
“mosquito”) were scored correctly. Words that were studied but were recalled from the 
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inappropriate list were scored as incorrect (e.g., words from the first list recalled during 
the second recall test). Words that were not studied (e.g., “scooter”), or words that were 
semantic variations of the studied words (e.g., “disgusting” instead of “disgusted”) were 
marked as intrusions. The mean number of intrusions across participants was low (M = 
1.65, SEM = 0.19), and therefore was not analyzed further. See Figure 2.2 for mean recall 
across lists.  
Similar to above, a 2 (Emotion: Emotional vs. Neutral) x 2 (Context: Negative 
List vs. Positive List) x 2 (List Order: Negative First vs. Positive First) mixed factors 
ANOVA with emotion and context as within-subjects factors and list order as a between-
subjects factor was conducted. As there were no significant effects of list order, or any 
interactions with emotion or context (all F’s < 0.437, all p’s > .511) list order was 
collapsed. As such, a 2 (Emotion: Negative vs. Positive) x 2 (Context: Negative List vs. 
Positive List) repeated measures ANOVA with both emotion and list context as within-
subjects factors was conducted. As hypothesized, there was a main effect of emotion, F(1, 
65) = 20.32, MSE = 0.03, p < .001, ηp
2  
= .238, such that emotional words (both negative 
and positive) were recalled more frequently than neutral words. There was no main effect 
of list context, F (1, 65) = .72, MSE = 0.03, p = .399, suggesting that recall performance 
did not differ based on whether the words were negative or positive in valence. The 
emotion x context interaction approached but did not reach significance, F(1, 65) = 3.25, 
MSE = 0.02, p = .076. To follow-up on this interaction, paired t-tests comparing recall of 
emotional words to the neutral words in their respective lists found that they were  
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Figure 2.2 Mean proportion recall across lists in experiment 1. Error bars represent 
standard error of the mean. 
 
significantly different, both p’s < .01. Taken together, these results suggest that emotional 
words were remembered better than neutral words, and emotional words were not 
remembered significantly differently across lists. Additionally, Bayesian analyses showed 
that the resulting posterior probability in favour of the main effect of emotion was pBIC(H1 
| D) = .999, providing very strong evidence that emotional words were better recalled than 
neutral words. In terms of the influence of list context, there was positive evidence 
supporting the null, pBIC(H0 | D) = .850, and weak evidence supporting the null emotion x 
context interaction, pBIC(H0 | D) = .617 
2.3.3 Gamma. Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma (G or γ) is generally used as a 
nonparametric measure of rank correlation. When variables are measured at the ordinal 
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Table 2.2 Mean Gamma Values Across Lists in Experiment 1 
Word List Gamma 
Negative .32 (.50) 
Neutral (Negative) .39 (.51) 
Positive .39 (.45) 
Neutral (Positive) .39 (.49) 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses besides their respective means. 
 
level, it can be used as a measure of the direction and associative strength between both 
variables (Nelson, 1984). Here, gamma was used as a measure of correspondence 
between participants’ JOLs and recall performance. Gamma values were computed for 
each participant, and the overall values were analyzed. See Table 2.2 for mean gamma 
values.  
Participants’ predictions were found to be significantly different from zero, 
suggesting that they were accurate (i.e., JOLs tended to correlate with actual recall) across 
all lists (all p’s < .001). These results were further evaluated by using a 2 (Emotion: 
Emotional vs. Neutral) x 2 (List Context: Negative vs. Positive) repeated measures 
ANOVA. There was no effect of emotion, F (1, 55) = 0.199, MSE = 0.263, p = .657, nor 
was there an effect of list context, F (1, 55) = 0.205, MSE = 0.292, p = .652. The emotion 
x context interaction was also non-significant, F (1, 55) = 0.347, MSE = 0.202, p = .559, 
pBIC(H0 | D) = .868. Bayesian analyses found positive evidence supporting the null in 
terms of all variables: Emotion, pBIC(H0 | D) = .878, context, pBIC(H0 | D) = .878, the 
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emotion x context interaction, pBIC(H0 | D) = .868. These results suggest that JOLs 
predicted free recall equivalently for emotional and neutral words across lists. 
2.3.4 Questionnaire Responses. Self-report responses on the questionnaire were 
coded based on Appendix C. For a count of responses for each question, see Table C1. Of 
primary interest were questions three, five, and six; these results will be discussed in 
detail. Two independent raters coded the responses. There was strong agreement between 
the raters, Cohen’s κ for all questions > .906, p < .001. A third independent rater resolved 
any disagreements. 
 2.3.4.1 Question 3. This question was included to ask participants if they 
noticed anything about the composition of the word lists. Of the 66 participants who were 
included in the analysis, 66.7% responded “yes”, while 33.3% responded “no”.  Of the 
66.7% who responded “yes”, 68.2% spontaneously reported they noticed emotional 
words in the list.  
 2.3.4.2 Question 5. This question was included to ask participants if they 
noticed any emotional words in their lists. For this question, participants were simply 
required to respond “yes” or “no”. Of the 66 participants who were included in the 
analysis, 92.4% indicated that they noticed emotional words, while only 7.6% indicated 
that they did not. 
 2.3.4.3 Question 6 and 6(a). For this question, participants were asked if 
they believe emotional words are remembered differently than neutral words. This 
question was the most relevant in terms of support for the hypothesis. Recall that it was 
proposed that the metamnemonic effect of emotional stimuli might be in part due to  
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Table 2.3 Correlations Between Participants’ JOLs and Recall Performance and the 
Positive (+) and Negative (-) Subscales of the PANAS 
 +PANAS -PANAS +JOL 
Benefit 
-JOL 
Benefit 
+Recall 
Benefit 
-Recall 
Benefit 
+PANAS 1.00      
-PANAS .021 1.00     
+JOL Benefit .213 .160 1.00    
-JOL Benefit .229 .179 .142 1.00   
+Recall Benefit -.304* .149     .333** .128 1.00  
-Recall Benefit .236 .188   .283*     .365** .205 1.00 
Note: * denotes p < .05; ** denotes p < .01.  
 
participants’ explicit beliefs regarding the memorability of emotional words. As expected, 
the vast majority held this belief: 90.9% responded “yes”, while only 9.1% of participants 
responded “no”. Of those that responded “yes”, 51.7% indicated that emotional words are 
better remembered than neutral words due to their relationship with a memory. For 
example, one participant explained that a negative word could be related to a significant 
negative event in one’s life (e.g., death), whereas other [neutral] words have no 
significance. 
 2.3.4.4 The PANAS. Correlational analyses between participants’ positive 
and negative benefit scores (i.e., mean emotional minus mean neutral JOL and recall 
performance) and their scores on the two PANAS subscales (i.e., sum of responses for 
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each subscale) yielded a significant negative correlation between recall of the positive list 
and scores on the positive PANAS subscale, r(54) = -.304, p < .05. No other correlations 
were significant (for both recall performance and JOLs). See Table 2.3 for a summary of 
all correlations. 
2.4 Discussion  
In order to examine how list structure influences the metamnemonic effect of 
emotion, participants were asked to study mixed lists of emotional and neutral words, and 
then make immediate JOLs after each word. After studying each word list, they were 
asked to complete a self-paced free recall test. It was expected that participants would be 
able to explicitly notice the emotional words as being emotional due to the “background” 
of neutral words, and subsequently assign higher JOLs to these items. Recall performance 
was expected to follow this trend. Participants were also asked to complete a post-test 
questionnaire regarding their thoughts about the experiment, and their beliefs about 
emotion and memory in general. This measure was expected to show that all participants 
held a belief that emotional information was more memorable than non-emotional 
information, providing support for a cognitive account of the metamnemonic benefit of 
emotion. 
As expected, participants gave higher JOLs to emotional words (both negative and 
positive) compared to neutral words, and their recall performance followed this pattern. 
Replicating Hourihan et al. (2017), the effect of emotion on participants’ metamnemonic 
performance was evident even though all words were equated on the dimension of 
arousal. Of most interest is the finding that participants’ JOLs were sensitive to 
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differences in valence. Because this difference emerged in spite of the words being 
equated on arousal, this result provides evidence against a physiological account of 
emotional effects on metamemory. Participants’ sensitivity to the influence of valence on 
memory performance is instead more consistent with the idea that the effects of emotional 
words on metamemory are influenced by intentional strategies. Hourihan et al. (2017) 
suggested that this effect only occurs when participants are able to explicitly notice the 
emotional words when compared to a ‘background’ of neutral words in the same list. The 
results from Experiment 1 are congruent with this proposition.  
Results from the questionnaire also support a relationship between participants’ 
JOLs and their beliefs. Nearly all participants reported noticing that there were emotional 
words in their study lists, and indicated that they held a belief that emotion influences 
memory. My interpretation is that participants explicitly notice emotional items when 
compared to neutral items in a mixed-list context, and incorporate a pre-existing belief 
regarding the items’ differential memorability, which drives the emotional JOL effect. 
Additional results from the PANAS indicate that the results observed in Experiment 1 
were not likely driven by participants’ current mood. If mood congruency were indeed a 
factor that contributed to participants’ performance, it would be expected that participants 
who scored higher on one of the subscales (either positive or negative) would show a 
larger recall benefit for the congruent items (either positive or negative). Surprisingly, the 
only significant result was a negative correlation between recall of positive items and the 
positive PANAS subscale. It appears as though participants who reported being in a 
positive mood actually recalled fewer positive valence words. Mood-incongruence is 
driven by individual differences, such as individuals’ self-esteem, world-views, and 
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attitudes. For example, Berkowitz (2000) has shown that individuals scoring higher on 
levels of self-esteem recall more positive information, even following a negative mood 
induction. Detailed participant demographics were not collected in Experiment 1, 
therefore it is entirely possible that this correlation is indeed a factor of participants’ 
attitudes; however, given that a mood induction was not involved in the procedure, nor 
were any other correlations between a performance benefit and subscale score found to be 
significant, this relationship is most likely spurious.  
Moreover, it remains unknown as to whether participants will show a similar trend 
in a pure-list context. That is, will participants still assign higher JOLs to emotional words 
relative to neutral words when these items are not clearly contrasted? Experiment 2 was 
conducted to further examine this scenario.  
3.1 Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1, it was found that participants gave higher JOLs to emotional 
words (both positive and negative) compared to neutral words in the same list, and recall 
performance followed this trend. These results were not due to mood-congruency effects, 
and results on the questionnaire suggest that participants believe that emotional 
information is more memorable than non-emotional information.  
Based on the idea that the metamnemonic effect of emotion depends on the 
distinctiveness of emotional items (relative to a background of neutral items), the 
cognitive account predicts that a design that eliminates this relative distinctiveness would 
eliminate any metamnemonic effect of emotional words. Simply put, effects should be 
limited to mixed-list designs. In Experiment 2, a pure-list design (lists composed of words 
equated for valence) was utilized to examine this possibility. Here, participants were 
  
 
 
31 
asked to study lists that were composed of either negative, positive, or neutral words, 
make immediate JOLs after each word, and complete a self-paced recall test. In 
Experiment 1, emotional and neutral words were directly contrasted in a mixed list, which 
appears to have led participants to notice emotional words as distinctive, relative to 
neutral words. Subsequently, they assigned higher JOLs to emotional words, and reported 
having a pre-existing belief that emotion benefits memory. Since participants were asked 
to study only one type of word in Experiment 2, it was predicted that there would be no 
effect of emotion between participants. That is, due to the fact that participants studied 
pure word lists (positive, negative, or neutral valence only), it was expected that they 
would be less likely to notice positive or negative words as “emotional”, and therefore be 
much less likely to consciously assign higher JOLs to these words. Based on these 
methodological differences, it was hypothesized that fewer participants would report 
noticing emotional words and use this distinctiveness strategically (relative to Experiment 
1), but it was expected that they would be just as likely to hold the belief that emotion 
affects memory.   
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants. Ninety undergraduate students from Memorial University of 
Newfoundland participated for one course credit or $10 CAD. Participants were pseudo-
randomly assigned to word-list condition based on their arrival to the laboratory (i.e., 
Negative, Positive, or Neutral List). There were 30 participants in each condition.  
3.2.2 Materials. Materials were similar to Experiment 1, save the words presented 
to participants. Three lists of words were selected from the ANEW database (Bradley & 
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Lang, 2010; see Appendix A for word lists). The bottom half of Table 2.1 displays mean 
valence and arousal ratings, and mean word frequency for the three lists in Experiment 2. 
The lists differed significantly on valence [neutral vs. negative words: t(78) = 19.05, p < 
.001, neutral vs. positive words: t(78) = 22.02, p < .001, negative vs. positive words: t(78) 
= 41.84, p < .001] but not on arousal [neutral vs. negative words: t(78) = 0.76, p = .451, 
neutral vs. positive words: t(78) = 0.02, p = .985, negative vs. positive words: t(78) = 
0.80, p = .424]. The words also did not differ significantly in terms of log word frequency 
[neutral vs. negative words: t(78) = 0.21, p = .838, neutral vs. positive words: t(78) = 
1.03, p = .308, negative vs. positive words: t(78) = 1.18, p = .241].  
3.2.3 Design. Emotion (Negative vs. Positive vs. Neutral) was manipulated 
between-subjects, and List Number (First vs. Second) was manipulated within-subjects. 
Mean JOLs and mean proportion recall were the dependent measures obtained. The 
correspondence between JOLs and recall for each participant was computed with gamma, 
and the mean value for each word list was obtained. Additional Bayesian analyses were 
conducted as per Experiment 1 to permit quantification of evidence for the Null 
hypothesis (see Masson, 2010). In correspondence with Experiment 1, questionnaire 
responses were coded based on the scheme in Appendix C. PANAS scores were summed 
for each participant and correlational analyses were conducted with JOLs and recall 
performance (i.e., benefit scores, as per Experiment 1). To determine whether responses 
on the questionnaire differed between experiments, further analyses were conducted with 
a chi square test of independence.       
 3.2.4 Procedure. The procedure of Experiment 2 was identical to that of 
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Experiment 1 (i.e., study, distractor, recall test), but participants were asked to study 
words of only one type—neutral, negative, or positive—for both of their study lists.  
3.3 Results  
Statistical significance was measured at p < .05 in all of the analyses to be 
discussed. Ninety participants were included in quantitative analyses. Data from four 
participants were not included in correlational analyses due to failure to follow 
instructions (e.g., not assigning values to all of the items in the PANAS), leaving 86 
participants in these analyses (29 negative, 29 neutral, 28 negative). 
 3.3.1 JOLs. A mixed factors ANOVA was conducted with List Number (First vs. 
Second) as a within-subjects factor and Emotion (Negative vs. Positive vs. Neutral) as a 
between-subjects factor. As hypothesized, there was no effect of emotion, F(2, 87) = 
1.82, MSE = 1.04, p = .168, suggesting that participants’ predictions did not differ based 
on the emotion (negative, positive, or neutral) of the words they studied. There was also 
no effect of list number, F(2, 87) = 3.346, MSE = 0.168, p = .071, nor was there a list x 
emotion interaction, F(2, 87) = 1.10, MSE = 0.167, p = .337, suggesting that JOLs for 
emotional and neutral words did not differ as a function of whether the words were shown 
in the first or second list. Given the theoretical interest in the observed null difference, a 
power analysis was conducted to compare JOLs between emotional and neutral 
conditions. The observed difference of 0.183 between the negative and neutral conditions 
produced a δ value of 0.918. To obtain a power of 0.80, this effect would require 
approximately 279 participants per group to reach statistical significance (at p = .05). 
Comparing positive and neutral conditions, the observed difference of 0.354 produced a  
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Figure 3.1 Mean JOL ratings across lists in Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard 
error of the mean. 
 
δ value of 1.693. To obtain a power = 0.80, this effect would require approximately 82 
participants per group to reach statistical significance (at p = .05). See Figure 3.1 for 
mean JOL ratings between lists. 
Further, Bayesian analyses were conducted in order to assess the probability of 
support for the null hypothesis. Regarding the influence of emotion, the resulting 
posterior probability in favor of the null hypothesis was pBIC(H0 | D) = .934, showing 
positive evidence that JOLs did not differ based on the emotion of the words that 
participants studied. There was weak support favouring the null with respect to list 
number, pBIC(H0 | D) = .635, and strong evidence supporting the null interaction, pBIC(H0 | 
D) = .967.  
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 3.3.2 Recall Performance. Recall was scored similarly to that of Experiment 1. 
The mean number of intrusions across participants was low (M = 1.60, SEM = 0.18) and 
therefore was not analyzed further. Similar to above, a mixed factors ANOVA was 
conducted with List Number (First vs. Second) as a within-subjects factor and Emotion 
(Negative vs. Positive vs. Neutral) as a between-subjects factor. As hypothesized, there 
was no effect of emotion, F(2, 87) = .69, MSE = 0.03, p = .503, suggesting that recall 
performance did not differ based on the emotion of the words participants studied. There 
was a main effect of list number, F(1, 87) = 6.78, MSE = 0.01, p = .011, ηp
2
 = .072, such 
that recall performance was better in the first list (M = 0.41, SD = 0.14) compared to the 
second list (M = 0.37, SD = 0.14). There was also no emotion x list number interaction, 
F(2, 87) = 2.33, MSE = 0.01, p = .103. Given the theoretical interest of the null results, a 
power analysis was conducted in order to compare recall performance between the 
emotional and neutral conditions. With respect to the negative and neutral conditions, the 
observed difference of 0.006 produced a δ value of 0.174 (observed power < .15). To 
obtain a power = 0.80, this effect would require over 7000 participants to reach statistical 
significance (at p = .05). Comparing positive and neutral words, the observed difference 
of 0.035 produced a δ value of 0.939 (observed power < .15). To obtain a power = 0.80, 
this effect would require approximately 267 participants to reach significance. See Figure 
3.2 for mean proportion recall between lists.  
 Bayesian analyses showed strong support for the null hypothesis with respect to 
the effect of emotion, pBIC(H0 | D) = .978. There was positive support for the alternate 
hypothesis with respect to list number, pBIC(H1 | D) = .753. Results favoured the null 
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Figure 3.2 Mean proportion recall across lists in Experiment 2. Error bars represent 
standard error of the mean. 
 
hypothesis with respect to the emotion x list number interaction, pBIC(H0 | D) = .898, 
supporting the notion that recall performance across lists did not differ based on emotion. 
 3.3.3 Gamma. As a measure of correspondence between JOLs and recall 
performance, t-tests comparing gamma values to zero showed that participants’ 
predictions were accurate across conditions, all p’s < .001. To further assess participants’ 
relative accuracy, a one-way ANOVA with gamma as the dependent measure and 
emotion as the independent measure was conducted. Results yielded no effect of emotion, 
F (2, 87) = 0.325, MSE = 0.054, p = .724. Bayesian analysis also yielded strong evidence 
in favour of the null, pBIC(H0 | D) = .985, suggesting there were no differences in 
participants’ accuracy based on which emotional words (negative, positive, or neutral)  
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Table 3.1 Mean Gamma Values Across Lists in Experiment 2 
Word List Value 
Negative .30 (.24) 
Positive .31 (.22) 
Neutral .35 (.24) 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses besides their respective means. 
 
they studied. See Table 3.1 for mean gamma values. 
  3.3.4 Questionnaire Responses. Consistent with the first experiment, the same 
two raters coded responses in Experiment 2 based on the coding scheme set in Appendix 
C. Of primary interest were questions three, five, and six; participants’ overall responses 
on these questions will be discussed in detail. For a count of responses for each question, 
see Table C2. Cohen’s κ was used as a measure of inter-rater reliability for each question. 
There was strong agreement between the raters, κ’s for all questions > .914, p < .001. A 
third independent rater solved any disagreements. 
 3.3.4.1 Question 3. This question was included to ask participants if they 
noticed anything about the composition of the word lists. Of the 90 participants who were 
included in the analysis, 63.3% responded “yes”, while 36.7% responded “no”. Of the 
63.3% who responded “yes”, 49.1% noted that they noticed semantic relationships 
between words. For example, one participant [incorrectly] noted that many of the words 
began with the same letter. More interestingly, of the 63.3% who responded “yes”, 43.9% 
spontaneously reported they noticed emotional words in the list. This 43.9% represents 
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56.7% of those who studied the negative list, and 26.7% of those who studied the positive 
word list. No participants who studied the neutral list spontaneously reported noticing 
emotional words. 
  3.3.4.2 Question 5. Question five was included to ask participants if they 
noticed any emotional words in their lists. For this question, participants were simply 
required to respond “yes” or “no”. 82.2% of participants indicated that they noticed 
emotional words, while 17.8% indicated that they did not. Specifically, all of the 
participants who studied negative words reported that they noticed emotional words, 
96.7% of those who studied positive words noticed emotional words, and 50% of those 
who studied neutral words claimed that they noticed emotional words. This finding will 
be explained in the discussion. 
3.3.4.3 Question 6 and 6(a). Question six was included to ask participants 
if they believed emotional words are remembered differently than neutral words. As 
expected, the majority of participants held this belief: 92.2% responded “yes”, while only 
7.8% of participants responded “no”. Of those that responded “yes”, 55.4% indicated that 
emotional words are better remembered than neutral words due to their relationship with 
a memory. For example, a participant noted that it was easier to recall words if they had 
been associated with an emotional experience. More specifically, all participants who 
studied negative words reported they held this belief, 90% of participants who studied the 
positive words held this belief, and 86.7% of participants who studied the neutral word 
list held this belief.  
  3.3.4.4 Chi square test of independence. A chi-square test of 
independence was performed to determine whether participants in Experiments 1 and 2 
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Table 3.2 Correlations Between Participants’ JOLs and Recall performance in the 
Negative List of Experiment 2 and the Positive and Negative Subscales of the PANAS 
 Mean Recall Mean JOLs Positive 
PANAS 
Negative 
PANAS 
Mean Recall 1.00     
Mean JOLs .063 1.00   
Positive 
PANAS 
.137 -.003 1.00  
Negative 
PANAS 
.000 -.233 -.142 1.00 
 
differed in their responses on questions 3, 5, and 6 of the questionnaire. All participants in 
who studied the neutral word lists in Experiment 2 were not included in any of the 
following analyses, as they did not study emotional items. There were no differences in 
participants spontaneously noticing emotional words between experiments, χ2 (1, N = 
126) = 0.183, p = .183. There were no differences in participants noticing emotional 
words when explicitly asked, χ2 (1, N = 126) = 2.42, p = .120. There were also no 
differences in participants reporting a belief that emotional information was remembered 
differently than neutral information, χ2 (1, N = 126) = 0.793, p = .373. 
  3.3.4.5 The PANAS. The correlation between mean JOLs and scores on 
the positive PANAS was marginally significant in the positive list context, p = .058; 
however, no other correlations were significant, all p’s > .122. Taken together, these 
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Table 3.3 Correlations Between Participants’ JOLs and Recall performance in the 
Positive List of Experiment 2 and the Positive and Negative Subscales of the PANAS 
 Mean Recall Mean JOLs Positive 
PANAS 
Negative 
PANAS 
Mean Recall 1.00    
Mean JOLs .322 1.00   
Positive 
PANAS 
.009 .356 1.00  
Negative 
PANAS 
.001 .278 .307 1.00 
 
Table 3.4 Correlations Between Participants’ JOLs and Recall performance in the 
Neutral List of Experiment 2 and the Positive and Negative Subscales of the PANAS 
 Mean Recall Mean JOLs Positive 
PANAS 
Negative 
PANAS 
Mean Recall 1.00    
Mean JOLs -.114 1.00   
Positive 
PANAS 
-.027 .293 1.00  
Negative 
PANAS 
-.155 -.214 .185 1.00 
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results suggest that participants’ performance was not due to mood-congruency effects. 
See Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 for a summary of correlations in each list context. 
3.4 Discussion 
 In Experiment 2, participants were asked to study a pure list of words (negative, 
positive, or neutral), make immediate JOLs after each word, and complete a free recall 
test after studying each list. After this, they completed a questionnaire identical to that of 
Experiment 1. As per the cognitive account (Hourihan et al., 2017), without the relative 
distinctiveness between emotional and neutral items, it was hypothesized that participants 
would not be able to utilize an explicit belief regarding the superior memorability of 
emotional words; therefore, it was expected that participants’ JOLs and recall 
performance would not differ between lists.  
 As expected, there were no significant differences with respect to participants’ 
JOLs between lists. That is, participants who studied an emotional list (negative or 
positive) did not assign JOLs differently than participants who studied the neutral list. 
Similarly, recall performance did not differ between participants. However, results 
yielded an unexpected significant effect of list number on recall. Better recall 
performance in List 1 compared to List 2 may simply be due to fatigue or proactive 
interference (see Keppel & Underwood, 1962; Underwood, 1957). For example, if 
participants judged the items to be semantically related to each other, or if participants 
were unable to separate the lists into separate contexts, items from the first list could have 
interfered with items from the second list, leading to the observed poorer recall for List 2 
compared to List 1.   
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Importantly, participants’ responses on the questionnaire support the proposition 
set forth in the cognitive account (Hourihan et al., 2017): Participants have a belief that 
emotional information should be more memorable than neutral information. Data 
analyses suggest that this belief was evident across both experiments; it appears as though 
individuals may make JOLs based on an explicit belief regarding how the intrinsic 
qualities of experimental stimuli are likely to affect memory. This belief, coupled with a 
design that obviates the distinctiveness of emotional items, appears to be the driving 
mechanism responsible for the metamnemonic effect of emotional words. 
4.1 General Discussion  
A primary goal of this thesis was to examine the untested components of the 
cognitive account of the emotional JOL effect proposed by Hourihan et al. (2017). In a 
series of experiments, they found that participants were more likely to give higher JOLs 
to negative valence words relative to neutral words in the same list. As such, no 
differences were found utilizing a pure list where words varied in both arousal and 
valence. Hourihan et al. suggested that the metamnemonic effect of emotion is likely 
limited to mixed-list designs, and is also coupled with participants’ explicit beliefs 
regarding the memorability of emotional information, such that participants assign higher 
JOLs to emotional words (relative to neutral words) because they believe emotional 
words are more memorable. The current thesis further examined the metamnemonic 
effect of emotion (without the influence of arousal), and found support for the cognitive 
account by explicitly querying participants regarding their beliefs about the memorability 
of emotional information. 
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 Two experiments were conducted wherein the emotional dimension of valence 
was manipulated while arousal was held constant. Participants were required to study lists 
of words, make immediate judgements of learning (JOLs) after each word, and complete 
a free recall test after each word list. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with 
mixed lists of emotional and neutral words, whereas participants only studied words of 
one valence (either negative, positive, or neutral) in Experiment 2. In Experiment 1, 
participants recalled more emotional words (both negative and positive) relative to neutral 
words. Importantly, the mixed-list design of discrete emotional and neutral categories 
appears to have allowed the emotional words to become relatively distinctive, as 
participants also indicated that the emotional words would be better recalled than the 
neutral words. Additionally, participants were found to be accurate in their predictions; on 
average, participants recalled the items they judged they would recall, and did not recall 
the items they judged they would not recall (regardless of emotion or list context). In 
Experiment 2, a pure-list design appears to have eliminated the distinctiveness between 
emotional and non-emotional words, eradicating the metamnemonic (and mnemonic) 
effect of emotion that was found in the first experiment.  
Given that the trend in superior memorability for emotional information relative to 
neutral information is commonly replicated (see Kensinger, 2009), the finding that 
participants recalled more negative and positive words relative to neutral words in 
Experiment 1 is relatively unsurprising. What is of more interest, however, is the finding 
that participants assigned higher JOLs to emotional words, but only in the mixed-list 
design of Experiment 1. Such findings have been noted in the literature with discrete-
level versions of the mixed-list design, in which a study list contains only two or three 
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‘types’ of items; emotional words are able stand out from neutral words as they are 
categorically distinctive (e.g., Hourihan et al., 2017; Talmi, 2013). When the 
distinctiveness of stimuli is reduced at study by presenting pure lists rather than mixed 
lists, the immediate mnemonic benefit for emotional words is eradicated (e.g., Dewhurst 
& Parry, 2000; Hourihan et al., 2017; Talmi & Moscovitch, 2004). This evidence 
suggests that if the emotional and neutral words were not evident as different ‘types’ of 
words at encoding, JOLs for emotional and non-emotional words would no longer differ 
because there would no longer be differences in distinctiveness.  
Distinctive items are simply those items that stand out from other items (see 
Schmidt, 1991). Primary distinctiveness refers to items that are distinctive due to context, 
whereas secondary distinctiveness refers to items that stand out relative to other items due 
to their inherent qualities. The two experiments outlined above give precedence to the 
notion of primary distinctiveness. In Experiment 1, words were studied in mixed lists 
such that emotional items could stand out from a background of neutral items. In 
Experiment 2, emotional words were studied in the absence of such background items. As 
mentioned above, the effects of emotional content on JOLs were only found in the first 
experiment; comparing distinctive items to other ‘types’ of items allowed these items to 
be preferentially remembered (see Talmi, 2013). As such, the results of the current thesis 
further bolster the idea that JOLs for emotional words are a product of list composition 
(i.e., primary distinctiveness) rather than inherent emotional content (i.e., secondary 
distinctiveness).  
This cognitive strategy lends itself from other memory phenomena, such as the 
Generation Effect (Slamecka & Graf, 1978) and the Orthographic Distinctiveness effect 
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(e.g., Hunt & Elliot, 1980). Research generally converges on the notion that items that are 
in some manner distinctive from other items incur a mnemonic benefit. For example, the 
production effect is based on the distinctiveness of produced items relative to unproduced 
items (MacLeod et al., 2010; Ozubko & MacLeod, 2010; Ozubko, Major, & MacLeod, 
2014). This relative distinctiveness has been attributed to design differences, such that the 
effect is limited to within-subjects designs (but see Fawcett, 2013). Interestingly, 
McDaniel and Bugg (2008) have proposed an item-order framework to account for 
differences in free recall performance in mixed-list designs versus pure-list designs. They 
suggest that the mnemonic advantage of items in mixed lists compared to pure lists is due 
to differential encoding of item information due to the ‘type’ of stimulus. More 
specifically, their account assumes that prior knowledge regarding item order mediates 
performance on free recall tasks, that list composition mediates the influence of item 
order of relatively distinct items, and ‘unusual’ items are given more item-level 
elaboration, regardless of list context. These propositions mirror those presented in the 
current thesis; however, in the words of McDaniel and Bugg, ‘unusual’ items are 
preferentially encoded, regardless of list context. The current experiments have shown 
that the metamnemonic effect of emotion is moderated by the list context, and that 
performance on these tasks is not affected by list order. Clearly, the distinctiveness of 
emotional items relative to neutral items is determined by list composition, rather than 
due to solely the inherent qualities of different ‘types’ of items.  
Evidence increasingly indicates that valence can influence the memorability of 
emotional events even without the influence of arousal (e.g., Hourihan et al., 2017). For 
example, Mickley and Kensinger (2008) found that the manner in which negative and 
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positive information is remembered is due to differences in the processes recruited during 
encoding (compared to the encoding of neutral information). However, this does not 
negate the fact that arousal influences memory, specifically, via factors that act during 
encoding and those that modulate memory consolidation (Kensinger, 2009). Indeed, 
evidence from neuroimaging studies supports the notion that emotional stimuli engage 
specific cognitive and neural mechanisms that enhance explicit memory beyond that of 
non-emotional stimuli. For example, increased brain activity in the amygdala during 
encoding has been linked with superior performance on delayed free recall tasks for 
negative information relative to neutral information (Cahill, 1996; 2004). Hamann (2001) 
examined the relationship between brain activity at encoding and later memory for 
emotional and non-emotional picture stimuli. For emotional stimuli, bilateral amygdala 
activity during encoding was related to better recognition memory for emotional stimuli 
compared to neutral stimuli; however this trend was not observed during recall. 
Unsurprisingly, amygdala activity was found to modulate activity in the hippocampus. 
From this, Hamann concluded that the amygdala plays a role in the enhancement of 
memory for emotional stimuli via its moderating effects on hippocampal activation. 
Provided, it is evident that arousal clearly does influence memory, but it does not 
necessarily contribute to the metamnemonic effect. Arousal’s effects on metamemory are 
instead likely to be the result of its interaction with valence (e.g., Tauber & Dunlosky, 
2010; Zimmerman & Kelley, 2012), and the fact that high arousal words are distinctive 
relative to low arousal words in the same study context. That is, participants may be 
operationalizing the label of “emotional” based on an aggregation of both valence and 
arousal. From this, it can be postulated that the dimension of arousal is sufficient, but not 
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necessary for the observed metamnemonic effects of emotion. Additionally, emotional 
items that are aggregates of valence and arousal may be subject to participants’ explicit 
beliefs regarding the memorability of emotional stimuli; as previously stated, evidence 
from the current thesis suggests that the metamnemonic effect relies upon the relative 
distinctiveness of emotional items compared to “less emotional” items, regardless of the 
dimension of arousal. 
Moreover, if participants made JOLs based only on an interpretation of the 
subjective physiological response associated with reading an emotional word, no 
differences in JOLs should have been observed in the current experiments, because all 
items were equated on arousal. Instead, it seems likely that the higher JOLs observed for 
emotional stimuli arises because of the manner in which lists are composed. The mixed 
lists used in Experiment 1 contrasted emotional items with neutral items, increasing the 
saliency of the emotional content of the words and potentially allowing participants to 
base their judgements on an explicit belief about the memorability of emotional words. 
For example, considering Experiment 1, studying words with differences in valence may 
have led participants to consciously focus on the fact that the study list consisted of 
different ‘types’ of words; the requirement to provide JOLs for each word may have then 
led participants to consciously rely on this distinction when asked to provide JOLs (cf. 
Mueller, Dunlosky, Tauber, & Rhodes, 2014). Thus, as per the cognitive account 
proposed by Hourihan et al. (2017), performance based on the relative fluency of 
emotional items may potentially be due to a primarily cognitive (or belief-based) strategy.  
In order to support this proposition, participants were explicitly queried about 
whether they noticed emotional words in their lists. Responses on the post-test 
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questionnaire support a cognitive account of the metamnemonic effect of emotion. 
Specifically, 92.4% participants in Experiment 1 noted that they noticed emotional words, 
as did all participants in Experiment 2 who studied the negative word list, 96.7% of those 
who studied the positive word list, and 50% of those who studied the neutral word list. It 
was not expected that 50% of participants who studied the neutral list would report 
noticing emotional words (as all words were equated at the midpoint of valence, and thus 
emotionally “neutral”; e.g., table); however, it is likely that these responses are due to 
demand characteristics. Earlier in the questionnaire (question 3), participants were asked 
if they noticed anything about the composition of the word lists. Participants who studied 
the emotional lists spontaneously reported noticing emotional items; however, none of the 
participants who studied the neutral lists commented on the emotionality of words; 
instead they discussed the semantic relationships they made between words. Interestingly, 
when they were later explicitly asked about the emotional content of the word lists 
(question 5), 50% of participants who studied the neutral word lists indicated that they 
noticed emotional words. This substantial increase in response from question 3 to 
question 5 indicates that participants may have simply responded based on demand 
characteristics. Participants were aware that they were participating in a study regarding 
memory for emotional content, but were unaware of the between-subjects manipulation of 
emotion; therefore, their response when explicitly queried about emotional content may 
be due to feeling as though they “should have” noticed emotional words. Additionally, 
participants were asked if they noticed any emotional words in the lists; it is unknown as 
to whether participants noticed one or multiple emotional items. Importantly, data 
analyses yielded null effects with respect to emotion in Experiment 2, bolstering the 
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notion that overall, these responses are likely non-reflective of participants’ actual 
performance. 
With respect to participants’ beliefs regarding the differential memorability of 
emotional and non-emotional items, 90.1% of participants in Experiment 1 indicated that 
they held a belief that emotional information is more memorable than neutral information, 
all participants who studied the negative list in Experiment 2 held this belief, and 
approximately 90% of those who studied the positive and neutral lists reported this belief. 
Data analyses yielded no significant differences between experiments, therefore it can be 
postulated that responses were not due to the differences in experimental context. 
Coupled with the effects only found in Experiment 1, these beliefs may be the driving 
mechanism behind the observed metamnemonic effects of emotion.  
The proposition that mnemonic effects may rely on beliefs is surprisingly not 
novel. Theory-based judgements (although sometimes not accurate) regarding memory 
have frequently been demonstrated. For example, participants’ JOLs have been shown to 
reflect the belief that generated items are more memorable than read items (Begg et al., 
1991; Slamecka & Graf, 1978), that text with illustrations is more memorable than text 
without (Serra & Dunlosky, 2010), and that larger font size is more memorable than 
smaller font size (Rhodes & Castel, 2008). Given that emotion is an intrinsic component 
of word stimuli, the notion that participants may also utilize pre-existing beliefs in 
making predictions about their memory for emotional stimuli is warranted (see Koriat, 
1997). The interactive nature between memory monitoring and performance therefore 
posits that participants use list distinctiveness to categorize emotional and non-emotional 
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words, and may then use a pre-existing belief about the differential memorability of these 
items to guide their judgements of future recall performance.  
Dubiously, the ‘belief-driven’ metamnemonic may also be one that is subject to 
bias. Confirmation biases are effects in information processing that are broadly defined as 
the tendency to “preserve one’s existing beliefs when searching for evidence, interpreting 
it, or recalling it from memory” (Risen & Gilovich, 2007, p. 113). Regardless of whether 
participants experience stimuli while in an otherwise “neutral” state (as this study 
assumes), they may still selectively remember the stimuli that conform to their 
expectations. More specifically, although all items were chosen from a normative 
database (ANEW, Bradley & Lang, 2010), participants may still have interpreted a 
neutral word as emotional (e.g., one participant noted that the neutral word “weight” was 
emotional, as it could be related to issues with body weight). This theory of selective 
memory is relatively ambiguous, such that the literature differs with respect to mnemonic 
effects. For instance, schema theory predicts that information matching prior expectations 
will be more easily stored and recalled than information that does not match individuals’ 
expectations (e.g., Bartlett, 1932; Mandler, 1984; Rumelhart, 1980). If participants have 
explicit beliefs about the superior memorability of emotional words, this pre-existing 
belief may potentially bias the manner in which they encode, process, and later retrieve 
said information. With respect to emotion, these beliefs may be partially mediated by 
self-referential processing. We know that things we relate to ourselves are better recalled 
than things we do not relate with (e.g., Klein, Loftus, & Burton, 1989; Rogers, Kuiper, & 
Kirker, 1977). As stated above, one participant who studied the pure-neutral list indicated 
that ‘weight’ was an emotional word as it could be related to one’s body image. It is 
  
 
 
51 
certainly possible then, that participants relate the emotional items to themselves during 
study; it may be this self-referential bias that allows participants to later recall the 
emotional items more accurately, rather than a conscious interpretation during study.  
This counter-explanation, although having surface validity, does not seem likely. 
Given the aforementioned assumptions, it would then be expected that the majority of 
participants would process emotional words in this manner, which would lead us to 
hypothesize that emotional effects on metamemory would occur regardless of list 
structure. That is, if participants were instead recalling emotional words more than neutral 
words because they simply were biased towards self-referential processing, an effect of 
emotion should have been evident in Experiment 2 as well as Experiment 1. Considering 
no such differences were found, I argue that the metamnemonic effect of emotional words 
is likely driven by list structure, coupled with participants’ pre-existing beliefs regarding 
the memorability of studied items.  
4.1.1 Conclusion  
Emotional information is generally remembered better than neutral information. 
Although participants tend to provide higher JOLs for emotional information compared to 
neutral information (Hourihan & Bursey, 2016; Nomi, Rhodes, & Cleary, 2013; Tauber & 
Dunlosky, 2012; Zimmerman & Kelley, 2010), these JOLs appear to be a product of list 
composition, rather than the product of a physiological response associated with reading 
an emotional stimulus (e.g., Hamann, 2001). It is known that participants’ metacognitive 
judgements are often influenced by pre-existing beliefs about memory, rather than their 
actual memory capability; in two experiments, I have provided evidence that JOLs for 
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emotional words may be primarily driven by belief. Simply put, participants have explicit 
beliefs about how emotion affects memory, and they use emotion as a cue when making 
predictions about their memory, but only in a context where it is relatively distinctive. As 
put eloquently by philosopher Martha Nussbaum (2001, p. 3), “[emotions] are parts, 
highly complex and messy parts, of reasoning itself”.  
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Appendix A: Word Lists 
Words used in Experiment 1 
 Number Word Valence Arousal Frequency 
Neutral Valence 1992 policy 4.50 4.30 3.14 
 2091 revert 4.53 4.73 1.56 
 426 table 5.22 2.92 3.73 
 408 square 4.74 3.18 3.21 
 1112 assume 4.69 4.97 3.23 
 227 industry 5.30 4.47 2.78 
 2123 rush 3.97 6.38 3.20 
 658 bland 4.10 4.29 1.75 
 2331 tendon 4.90 4.90 1.48 
 1056 admit 4.93 4.97 3.48 
 307 patent 5.29 3.50 2.1 
 941 plain 4.39 3.52 3.05 
 2410 usage 4.93 4.90 1.43 
 2022 propeller 5.43 4.43 1.90 
 346 rattle 5.03 4.36 2.24 
 2265 steam 5.00 4.35 2.84 
 2249 spine 5.12 4.48 2.47 
 1972 pin 4.50 5.17 2.92 
 1326 compel 4.97 5.43 1.72 
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 1195 blurt 4.48 5.36 1.42 
Negative Valence 368 sad 1.61 4.13 3.51 
 365 rotten 2.26 4.53 2.95 
 124 disgusted 2.45 5.42 1.96 
 76 coffin 2.56 5.03 2.66 
 411 stink 3.00 4.26 2.83 
 272 measles 2.74 5.06 2.03 
 885 mosquito 2.80 4.78 1.97 
 169 foul 2.81 4.93 2.87 
 704 crime 2.89 5.41 3.56 
 1087 annoyance 2.97 5.18 1.42 
Positive Valence 1951 peaceful 7.77 2.87 2.76 
 468 vacation 8.16 5.64 3.22 
 246 kindness 7.82 4.30 2.66 
 35 beauty 7.82 4.95 3.39 
 347 refreshment 7.44 4.45 1.72 
 466 useful 7.14 4.26 2.83 
 135 easygoing 7.20 4.30 1.36 
 105 delight 8.26 5.44 2.21 
 2239 soothe 7.98 4.96 1.83 
 372 satisfied 7.94 4.94 2.90 
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Words used in Experiment 2 
 Number Word Valence Arousal Frequency 
Neutral Valence 2050 react 5.63 5.87 2.56 
 928 passage 5.28 4.36 2.60 
 1802 loud 4.77 6.10 2.61 
 825 item 5.26 3.24 2.80 
 57 butter 5.33 3.17 3.02 
 1888 newspaper 5.52 4.42 3.08 
 2219 smudge 4.00 4.43 1.72 
 2365 ton 4.68 4.33 2.58 
 2307 swipe 4.86 4.33 1.92 
 2102 road 5.53 4.9 3.76 
 2297 supply 5.27 4.38 2.98 
 2349 thud 4.47 5.20 2.00 
 2004 position 5.74 5.10 3.57 
 1779 ledge 4.13 5.35 2.26 
 2156 seek 5.59 5.12 2.97 
 1096 application 4.69 5.62 2.71 
 874 metal 4.95 3.79 3.00 
 1232 bustle 5.43 5.80 1.63 
 1977 plate 5.30 4.00 3.12 
 410 startled 4.50 6.93 2.10 
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 1689 hire 5.77 5.63 3.11 
 380 seat 4.95 2.95 3.60 
 309 pencil 5.22 3.14 2.70 
 810 indifferent 4.61 3.18 1.77 
 325 prairie 5.75 3.41 2.16 
 2250 sponge 5.11 3.52 2.53 
 1054 adjust 5.25 5.39 2.46 
 1261 cave 4.78 5.44 2.85 
 633 alien 5.60 5.45 2.95 
 1197 bolt 5.42 5.73 2.55 
 2449 wet 5.57 5.57 3.30 
 1316 cockpit 6.31 5.53 2.22 
 1312 clue 5.57 5.52 2.95 
 2338 thigh 5.77 5.47 2.28 
 1487 endure 5.50 5.56 2.35 
 2446 weight 4.28 5.40 3.27 
 1754 jumble 4.41 5.30 1.23 
 1326 compel 4.97 5.43 1.72 
 2152 seal 5.81 5.42 2.88 
 1980 plea 4.04 5.11 2.54 
Negative Valence 1451 drown 2.20 6.84 2.73 
 2345 threat 2.50 6.08 3.03 
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 419 suicide 1.25 5.73 3.24 
 390 sickness 2.25 5.61 2.61 
 2113 rot 2.68 5.18 2.60 
 971 scandal 3.32 5.12 2.62 
 2240 sorrow 2.32 4.48 2.55 
 1427 disability 2.52 4.46 2.01 
 203 headache 2.02 5.07 2.86 
 732 dummy 3.38 4.35 2.70 
 1924 orphan 2.29 5.35 2.47 
 882 mold 3.55 4.07 2.34 
 906 noose 3.76 4.39 2.05 
 908 nuisance 3.27 4.49 2.22 
 86 corpse 2.18 4.74 2.71 
 627 ache 2.46 5.00 2.11 
 588 dead 1.94 5.73 4.36 
 1645 grieve 2.27 5.60 2.05 
 2264 steal 3.18 5.11 3.43 
 467 useless 2.13 4.87 3.01 
 873 messy 3.15 3.34 2.55 
 779 handicap 3.29 3.81 2.15 
 812 inferior 3.07 3.83 2.20 
 1858 molest 1.90 5.20 1.51 
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 1429 disappointment 2.37 4.60 2.44 
 2473 wrong 2.93 4.67 4.43 
 726 discomfort 2.19 4.17 1.91 
 1981 plead 3.74 5.00 2.55 
 206 helpless 2.20 5.34 2.76 
 1880 nag 2.90 5.40 2.05 
 964 robber 2.61 5.62 2.38 
 2212 smack 3.50 5.64 2.67 
 2164 sever 3.08 5.72 1.91 
 392 sin 2.80 5.78 2.91 
 465 upset 2.00 5.86 3.58 
 1520 expel 2.77 5.90 1.85 
 973 scar 3.38 4.79 2.64 
 1852 miserable 1.55 5.00 3.04 
 1935 pale 3.17 3.50 2.61 
 720 deformed 2.41 4.07 1.83 
Positive Valence 315    pillow 7.92 2.97 2.76 
 183 gentle 7.31 3.21 2.93 
 58 butterfly 7.17 3.47 2.45 
 1323 comfortable 8.07 3.59 3.38 
 118 dignified 7.10 4.12 2.69 
 2294 sunflower 7.41 4.30 1.54 
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 132 dream 6.73 4.53 3.83 
 355 respectful 7.22 4.60 1.99 
 193 grateful 7.37 4.58 3.14 
 1067 agree 7.00 4.59 3.52 
 1153 bathe 7.37 4.63 2.11 
 343 rainbow 8.14 4.64 2.61 
 268 luxury 7.88 4.75 2.49 
 2244 spa 7.86 4.82 2.38 
 1140 balloons 6.97 4.90 2.38 
 2462 wishful 7.50 5.57 1.73 
 249 knowledge 7.58 5.92 3.11 
 420 sunrise 7.86 5.06 2.49 
 175 friendly 8.43 5.11 3.12 
 1966 picnic 7.07 5.18 2.78 
 1696 honesty 7.88 5.25 2.57 
 145 enjoyment 7.80 5.20 1.85 
 1961 personality 7.48 5.88 2.91 
 453 trophy 7.78 5.39 2.59 
 502 sky 7.37 4.27 3.36 
 986 soft 7.12 4.63 3.21 
 2094 rhythm 7.06 5.73 2.75 
 139 elegant 7.43 4.53 2.51 
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 2213 smart 7.93 5.90 3.69 
 1917 opportunity 7.41 6.47 3.32 
 2154 security 7.28 4.22 3.68 
 293 nature 7.65 4.37 3.36 
 404 snuggle 7.92 4.16 1.83 
 98 oasis 7.79 5.04 2.00 
 2072 relief 6.81 4.17 2.87 
 143 engaged 8.00 6.77 3.12 
 63 carefree 7.54 4.17 1.85 
 255 liberty 7.98 5.60 2.93 
 1019 treat 7.36 5.62 3.42 
 77 comedy 8.37 5.85 2.78 
Note: Number refers to the entry number in the ANEW database (Bradley & Lang, 2010) 
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Appendix B: Questionnaire  
[Instructions to participants:] 
Congratulations! You have reached the final task of the experiment. 
Please read each question thoroughly and answer as honestly and accurately as possible. 
You may use the back of the paper if you run out of room. 
Please notify the researcher when you are finished. 
There is no time limit. 
1.  In the experiment, do you think you recalled some words more easily than others? 
1 (a). If “yes”, please explain why you think you recalled some words more easily than 
others. 
2.  Do you believe your predictions of future recall were accurate? 
2 (a). Please explain your response to (2). 
3. Did you notice anything about the composition of the word list(s)? 
3 (a). If “yes”, please explain how you think the list (s) was/were composed. 
4. In general, do you believe that certain words are easier (or harder) to remember than 
others? 
4 (a). If “yes”, please explain why you think certain words vary in their memorability. 
5. Did you notice any emotional words in your list(s)? 
6. Do you believe emotional words are remembered differently than neutral words? 
6 (a). If “yes”, please explain why you believe emotional and neutral words differ in their 
memorability.   
7. Do you believe that emotional words are remembered differently (e.g., “Happy” vs. 
“Sad”)? 
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7 (a). If “yes”, please explain how you think different emotional words vary in their 
memorability.  
8. Additionally, we would like to ask how you are feeling right now. 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe difference feelings and emotions. 
Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. 
Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, in the present moment. 
Use the following scale to record your answers 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very slightly or 
not at all 
A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
 
  _____ interested    _____ irritable 
  _____ distressed    _____ alert 
  _____ excited     _____ ashamed 
  _____ upset     _____ inspired 
  _____ strong     _____ nervous 
  _____ guilty     _____ determined 
  _____ scared     _____ attentive 
  _____ hostile     _____ jittery 
  _____ enthusiastic    _____ active 
  _____ proud     _____ afraid 
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Appendix C: Questionnaire Coding Scheme 
Note: All questions (with the exception of 8) began with a yes/no question, then a short 
answer for part (a). ‘Yes’ answers were coded as 1, ‘No’ answers were coded as 0. 
 
Question 1 (a)  
1= Primacy/Recency: the participant mentions words at the beginning or end of the 
list(s). E.g. “I think I recalled words shown at the beginning of the task more easily.” 
2= Word Length: the participant states that shorter/longer words in the list(s) were 
easier/harder to recall. E.g. “The shorter ones were easier to remember…” 
3= Frequency: the participant states that more common/uncommon words were 
easier/more difficult for them to recall. E.g. “…common words are easier.” 
4= Semantic Relationships: the participant states that they noticed some words were able 
to be grouped together/were similar semantically. E.g., “…some started with the same 
letter.” 
5= Personal Significance: the participant states that word(s) related to their own lives are 
easier to recall. E.g., “Some words I could relate to my personal life.” 
6= Emotion: the participant explicitly mentions that word(s) that are more 
positive/negative/emotional are more memorable. E.g. “Words of emotion, both negative 
and positive ones, were easier to recall for me.” 
7= Other: the participant mentions something that does not easily fit into a cognitive 
framework, or mentions something indistinguishable. E.g. “Some words worked together 
well or related to each other…others seemed completely unrelated and were easier to 
recall.” 
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Question 2 (a)  
1= Confidence in Accuracy: the participant clearly states they knew they recalled the 
words they gave higher ratings to (or vice versa) [they answered “yes” to the first part of 
the question]. E.g. “I think my predictions were as accurate as I could have got them.” 
2= No recall confidence: the participant states they couldn’t remember the words they 
thought they would. E.g. “No, I recalled less words than I thought.” 
3= Inattention: the participant states they may have been rehearsing the words during 
this time and did not provide accurate responses, or they may explicitly state they were 
not attentive. E.g. “I used this time to remember the words as best I could and didn’t 
focus on my prediction.” 
4= Reevaluation: the participant states that they realized their ratings were inaccurate at a 
later point in the experiment, or during the questionnaire, once they gave it more thought. 
E.g. “After doing other tasks it was hard to remember the words.” 
5= Inadvertent Retrieval: the participant states that their pattern of recall was opposite 
to their predictions. E.g. “Things I thought I would remember I did not remember, but 
things I thought I wouldn’t remember, I remembered.” 
6= Unclear: the participant does not answer the question correctly, or their reasoning is 
unclear. E.g. “I think that most people will forget the words after only seeing them once 
and them having to do another task and then try and remember them again.” 
7= Overconfidence: the participant states that they were initially overconfident in their 
judgements, and did not think they recalled as much as they thought they would. E.g. “I 
couldn’t remember all the ones I rated above 5”. 
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Question 3 (a)  
1= Word Length: the participant discusses words specific to how short or long they 
were. E.g. “…longer words harder to spell.” 
2= Frequency: the participant states that the word list(s) had words used in everyday 
conversations (or vice versa). E.g. “It seemed that some of the words were used 
commonly in daily language…” 
3= Semantic Relationships: the participant states that they noticed some words were able 
to be grouped together/were similar semantically. E.g. “Some of the words were often 
related for example the word stressful and annoyance…” 
4= Positive Emotion: the participant explicitly states that they noticed many “happy” 
words. E.g. “The second list was happier…easier to recall.” 
5= Negative Emotion: the participant explicitly states that they noticed many “sad” 
words. E.g. “The first list of words included some that were associated with negative 
emotions…” 
6= All Valence: the participant noticed that one word list was negative and neutral and 
the other was positive and neutral, or they mention “emotion” in general (not specific to 
code 4 or 5). E.g. “In list A there were pleasant words mixed in with more mundane 
words whereas in list B there were unpleasant words mixed in.” 
 
Question 4(a)  
1= Primacy/Recency: the participant specifically discusses words at the beginning or end 
of the list(s). 
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2= Word Length: the participant discusses words specific to how short or long they 
were. E.g. “…longer words harder to spell.” 
3= Frequency: the participant states that the word list(s) had words used in everyday 
conversations (or vice versa). E.g. “It seemed that some of the words were used 
commonly in daily language…” 
4= Semantic Relationships: the participant states that they noticed some words were able 
to be grouped together/were similar semantically. E.g. “Some of the words were often 
related for example the word stressful and annoyance…” 
5= Personal Significance: the participant states that word(s) related to their own lives are 
easier to recall. E.g. “Some words make you think of past experiences.” 
6= Emotion: the participant explicitly mentions that word(s) that are more 
positive/negative/emotional are more memorable. E.g. “Words that create emotion and 
are more emotional words so they are easier to remember.” 
7= No belief: the participant did not answer because they responded “no” to the first part 
of the question. 
8= Other: the participant mentions something that does not easily fit into a cognitive 
framework, or does not explicitly answer the question. E.g. “Words like ‘assume’ have 
ways to remember how to spell them…” 
 
Question 6 (a)  
1= Relates to a memory: the participant states that emotional words are more memorable 
because they have significance to their life, they provide an example of a memory, or they 
explicitly state that emotional words “remind” them of the past. E.g. “The emotional 
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words more easily associate with previous memory, whereas you likely have no personal 
connection with neutral words”. 
2= Relates to a current emotion: the participant states that emotional words are more 
memorable because you “experience” them, or they state that reading them evokes the 
feeling represented by the word in the moment. E.g. “If they play on your emotions and 
affect your emotions in some way, you will probably remember them more than ones that 
had no effect on you.” 
3= Stronger word meaning: the participant discusses the quality of the word itself, in 
comparison to non-emotional words. E.g. “Emotional words often have a stronger 
meaning behind them and neutral words come across as irrelevant.” 
4= Neural mechanisms: the participant provides some neurological explanation 
(regardless of whether it has merit). E.g. “Memory centers in the brain are extremely 
close to/overlap with emotional centers…” 
5= Memory technique: the participant states emotional words are used to employ a 
memory technique with, such as imagability or categorical organization. E.g. “…they 
make you picture something, whereas neutral words do not.” 
6= No answer: the participant has responded “no” to the previous part of the question. 
7= Other: the participant does not explicitly answer the question, or relates it to their own 
performance in the experiment. E.g. “Because I could mostly only remember emotional 
words and the neutral words weren’t as memorable.” 
 
Question 7(a)  
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1= Variance determined by subject: the participant states that individual differences 
plays a role in the memorability of different emotional words. E.g. “I think that happy 
words are more easily remembered in optimistic people and sad words are more easily 
remembered in pessimistic people…” 
2= Vary due to relation to a memory: the participant states that it depends on how well 
the words relate to something in memory. E.g. “Different emotional words vary in their 
memorability because you can associate them with memories/encounters in your own 
life.” 
3= Vary due to characteristics of the words: the participant mentions something about 
the “strength” or arousal of words. E.g. “I think the powerful emotional words were the 
most memorable…” 
4= Vary due to differences in the environment: the participant states there are more 
instances of positive/negative events in the world/their life and this determines the 
influence of emotional words. E.g. “Negative words are more likely to be remembered 
because there are more happy things in the world than sad” 
5= No answer: the participant has responded “no” to the previous part of the question. 
6= Other: the participant did not correctly address the question. E.g. “Because sad is 
more of a negative emotion, a higher tendency to remember it.” 
7= Neural Mechanisms: the participant provides a neurological explanation. E.g. 
“…they may evoke a different feeling and hence may be stored in memory differently on 
the basis of the feeling that that word evokes.” 
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Table C1 Count of responses across questions in the post-test questionnaire of 
Experiment 1 
                                                 Code Number 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Question          
1 2 64        
1(a)  6 9 9 11 23 19 11  
2 46 20        
2(a)  20 12 1 9 18  7  
3 22 44        
3(a)  2 3 10 17 15 11 22 4 
4 2 64        
4(a)   10 24 5 29 17 1 7 
5 5 61        
6 6 60        
6(a)  31 20 6 1 3 7 4  
7 28 38        
7(a)  12 11 8 5 28 6 1  
Note: Total percentage per question may add up to > 100 as multiple codes per participant 
were possible.  
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Table C2 Count of responses across questions in the post-test questionnaire of 
experiment 2 
                                                                 Code Number 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Question          
1 5 85        
1(a)  5 10 17 19 40 16 13  
2 60 30        
2(a)  30 11 0 8 25 5 24  
3 33 57        
3(a)  3 6 30 1 2 17 1 4 
4 7 83        
4(a)  2 16 28 7 40 17 7 10 
5 16 74        
6 7 83        
6(a)  46 26 16 5 6 7 6  
7 32 58        
7(a)  24 15 14 8 32 7 2  
Note: Total percentage per question may add up to > 100 as multiple codes per participant 
were possible.  
